Beyond kompromat: Coercion, corruption, and deterred defection in Uzbekistan

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

    Abstract

    Kompromat, or compromising material used against political elites, is widely considered to be essential in shoring up authoritarian durability. While it is useful in preempting or penalizing individual challengers, however, kompromat is a highly targeted and selective tool that does little to deter widespread elite defection in authoritarian regimes in the middle of a crisis. Instead, where autocrats have previously contracted on violence-coopted security for their use in repression-ruler concessions concentrate rent seeking under the national executive, creating winner-take-all stakes that makes defection prohibitively risky. Through the example of Uzbekistan's regime durability during the 2005 Andijan uprising, this article examines the effect of this political economy of coercion on deterring elite defection.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)103-121
    Number of pages19
    JournalComparative Politics
    Volume50
    Issue number1
    StatePublished - Oct 1 2017

    All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

    • Sociology and Political Science

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