Abstract
The principles of agency theory and how the theory can be used as a framework for the design ofphysiciai selection procedures and of physician compensation contracts and control systems for the regulation ofphysicic practices are discussed. The theory is used to show why third party payers who wish to control expenditure for high quality health care may be bette off if they enter into salary contracts rather than fee-for-service or capitation contracts with individual physicians.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 57-67 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Health Care Management Review |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1995 |
| Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Leadership and Management
- Health Policy
- Strategy and Management